Introduction

Preliminary Discussion
The role of cryptographic algorithms is to provide information security [9, 28, 42, 44, 45, 46] . In general, proper data encryption and authentication mechanisms with access control are the preferred means for a trusted secure system [44, 45] . The most popular public key cryptosystems are the RSA [41] , NTRU Encrypt algorithm [21, 22, 23, 24] , elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [27, 37, 43, 48] , the algorithms based on diophantine equations and discrete logarithms [33, 15] , and those based on multivariate quadratic polynomials [6, 29] . The RSA, the NTRU and the ECC are assumed to be secure algorithms unless there are new breakthroughs in integer factoring (for RSA), or in lattice reduction (for NTRU), or in elliptic curve discrete logarithm techniques (for ECC) [11, 19] .
In this paper, algorithms for public key cryptography as well as digital signature based on multivariate mappings are described, with plain and encrypted message arrays consisting of elements from a fixed commutative and finite ring or field. The keys can be built up starting from independently chosen small degree polynomial or easy exponential mappings, resulting in fast key generation and facilitating easy changes of keys as often as required. The security depends on the difficulty of solving parametric simultaneous multivariate equations involving polynomial or exponential mappings [8, 10, 16, 17, 35, 36, 12, 14] in the case of straightforward attacks, and on the difficulty of finding the private keys in the case of key recovery attacks.
Notation
In the sequel, let Z be the set of integers, and let N be the set of positive integers. For a positive integer n ≥ 2, let Z n be the ring of integers with addition and multiplication mod n, and Z * n be the commutative group of invertible elements in Z n , with respect to multiplication operation in Z n . Let F be a finite field, consisting of p n elements for some positive integer n and prime number p, and let F * be the multiplicative group of nonzero elements in F. Let G be a finite cyclic group of order n ≥ 2. Let E be either F or Z n or G. If E = G, where G is equipped with only the group operation, then G is isomorphic to Z n , where the group operation in G is identified with the addition operation of Z n . The addition operation of Z is a primary operation, and the multiplication operation, that can be treated as a secondary operation [34] over the additive group Z, is defined uniquely such that the distribution laws hold true, with 1 as the multiplicative identity, rendering Z as the commutative ring, and the same holds for Z n . Let E[x 1 , . . . , x m ], for m ∈ N, be the algebra of multivariate polynomials in m formal variables x 1 , . . . , x m with coefficients in E. Now, if G = F * , for a finite field F, then the group operation in G coincides with the multiplication operation in , with x = x 1 . A variable with its name expressed in bold face assumes values from a product space, which is a product of finitely many copies of the same set, and each component of the variable, expressed in the corresponding case without boldness and a positive integer subscript, assumes values from the constituent component space, succinctly as, for example, x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ E m , for some m ∈ N.
Polynomials over Z n
Let n = 
Modular Exponentiation over Z n
The modular exponentiation operation is extensively studied in connection with the RSA cryptosystem [9, 28, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46] . In this section, the modular exponentiation is extended to the situation, wherein the exponents are functions. The security of the RSA system depends on the difficulty of factorization of a positive integer into its prime factors. However, simplification of computations as well as porting of variables from base level to exponentiation level by a homomorphism requires availability of prime factors in advance for both encryption and decryption, while working with multivariate mappings involving functions as exponents. In the sequel, let ϕ be the Euler phi function [9, 28, 42, 46] . Let n = r i=1 p l i i , where r ∈ N, l i ∈ N\{1} and p i are distinct prime numbers, for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Let EX P(Z n ; [x 1 , . . . , x m ]) be the smallest set of expressions, closed with respect to addition and multiplication, and containing expressions of the form a(x 1 , . . . , x m ) b(x 1 , ..., x m ) , where a(x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ Z n [x 1 , . . . , x m ], and either 1. as a formal expression, b(x 1 , . . . , x m ) does not depend on (x 1 , . . . , x m ) and evaluates to any fixed positive integer, or 2. a(x 1 , . . . , x m ) evaluates to elements in Z * n , for all values of (x 1 , . . . , x m ) in some domain of interest, which is a subset of Z m n , and b(x 1 , . . . , x m ) is of the form c(h(x 1 ), . . . , h(x m )), for some expression c(z 1 , . . . , z m ) ∈ EX P(Z ϕ(n) ; [z 1 , . . . , z m ]) and ring homomorphism h from Z n into Z ϕ(n) .
The condition in (1) above implies that Z
Thus, the integers in Z and those in Z n , for various modulus positive integers n ≥ 2, need to be distinguished clearly as separate elements. The expressions in EX P(Z n ; [x 1 , . . . , x m ]) are turned into mappings, by identifying appropriate domains of values and interpretation for variables and operations in the respective domains [12, 14, 34, 35] . For x ∈ Z m n and s ∈ N\{1}, such that s | n, let
. Now, for x ∈ X and k ∈ Z, the following holds:
[z 1 , . . . , z n ] be such that the following holds: g i (y mod ϕ(p
. Now, ϕ(p
be the map defined by
and 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Then, the map h is a ring homomorphism from the
into the ring of direct product
. If the base level and exponentiation level interpretation maps are I base and I exponent , respectively, then I exponent can be chosen to be h • I base , applied from right to left in the written order, preserving the respective ring operations in the base level and exponentiation level subexpressions. If l i = 1, for some index i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ r, then exponentiation along ith component can be carried by interpreting Z p i to be a finite field, and porting values of base level expressions to exponentiation level expressions by discrete logarithm mapping, as discussed in section 1.5.
Modular Exponentiation over F
Let F be a finite field containing p n elements and n = p n − 1, for some prime number p and positive integer n. Let EX P(F ; [x 1 , . . . , x m ]) be the smallest set of expressions, closed with respect to addition and multiplication, and containing expressions of the form a(x 1 , . . . , x m ) b(x 1 , ..., x m ) , where For a primitive element a ∈ F * , let log a : F * → Z n be the discrete logarithm function defined by log a (g) = x, exactly when a x = g, for g ∈ F * and x ∈ Z n . Thus, the group homomorphism h can be taken to be log a . If the base level and exponentiation level interpretation maps are I base and I exponent , respectively, then I exponent can be chosen to be log a • I base , applied from right to left in the written order. For porting a subexpression involving addition operation in F, such as, for example, f (x) ∈ F[x 1 , . . . , x m ], where f (x) = 0, for x ∈ G m , where G = F * , occurring in a base level expression to an exponentiation level, the base level subexpression is replaced by a supplementary variable z, which is ported to first exponentiation level by the discrete logarithm mapping. In the subsequent levels of exponentiation, the interpretation is performed by applying ring homomorphisms, as discussed in section 1.4.
Main Results
Parametric Injective Mappings
Let E be either F or Z n . Let G ⊆ E be the domain of interpretation for the variables occurring in the mappings. For l ∈ {0} ∪ N and m ∈ N. a parametric multivariate injective mapping η(z 1 , . . . , z l ; (x 1 , . . . , x m )) from G m into E m is a multivariate injective mapping, which is an expression from either E[x 1 , . . . , x m , z 1 , . . . , z l ] or EX P(E ; [x 1 , . . . , x m , z 1 , . . . , z l ]) with interpretation conventions as discussed in sections 1.4-1.5, as appropriate, for (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ G m and (z 1 , . . . , z l ) ∈ Z ⊆ E l , and its parametric inverse η −1 (z 1 , . . . , z l ; (y 1 , . . . , y m )) is such that, for every fixed (z 1 , . . . , z l ) ∈ Z, the following holds: if η(z 1 , . . . , z l ; (x 1 , . . . , x m )) = (y 1 , . . . , y m ), then (x 1 , . . . , x m ) = η −1 (z 1 , . . . , z l ; (y 1 , . . . , y m )), for every (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ G m and (y 1 , . . . , y m ) ∈ E m . For example, let n be the set cardinality of G = F * , a ∈ F * be a fixed primitive element, which is made known in the public key, and η(z 1 , . . . , z l ; x) = f (z 1 , . . . , z l )x g(log a (z 1 ), ..., log a (z l )) , where f (z 1 , . . . , z l ) ∈ EX P F ; [z 1 , . . . , z l ] and g(t 1 , . . . , t l ) ∈ EX P Z n ; [t 1 , . . . , t l ] are such that f (z 1 , . . . , z l ) = 0, for z 1 , . . . , z l ∈ F * , and gcd g(t 1 , . . . , t l ), n) = 1,
. Then, η z 1 , . . . , z l ; x is a parametric bijective mapping from F * into F * , with z 1 , . . . , z l ∈ F * as parameters, and η
Parametrization Methods
Let, for some positive integers k, l and m, g i (z 1 , . . . , z l ), 1 ≤ i ≤ k, be a partition of unity of E l , i.e.,
. . , x m ), be parametric multivariate injective mappings from G m into E m , that may or may not depend on the parameters z 1 , . . . , z l . Let φ i (z 1 , . . . , z l ) and χ i (z 1 , . . . , z l ) be expressions such that φ i (z 1 , . . . , z l ) evaluates to invertible elements in E, for
is a parametric multivariate injective mapping, with its parametric inverse η
For public key cryptography hashing keys, it is possible to construct parametric multivariate injective mappings in section 3.1 with any expressions φ i (z 1 , . . . , z l ) that evaluate to only invertible elements, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, having only a small number of terms. For digital signature hashing keys in section 3.1, however, the multivariate expressions φ i (z 1 , . . . , z l ) = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, must be such that both φ i (z 1 , . . . , z l ) and its multiplicative inverse [φ i (z 1 , . . . , z l )] −1 are expressible with only a small number of terms each.
Partition of Unity of F
Let f (z) ∈ EX P(F ; [z]), which is called a discriminating function, and let K f be the codomain of f , i.e., K f = {f (x) :
, is a partition of unity of F l . [32] . Now, each equivalence class is an affine vector subspace of the form {y + x : f (x) = 0, x ∈ F}, for some y ∈ F. Thus, if r is the rank of f as linear operator from F into F with Z p as the field, then the nullity of f is n − r, each equivalence class has p n−r elements, and there are k = p r equivalence classes. For the number of equivalence classes to be small, the rank r of f must be small, such as r = 1 or r = 2. (B) Let f (z) = z r , where r is a large positive integer dividing p n − 1. Now, the equivalence classes are {0} and the cosets of the congruence relation x ∼ y if and only if (x −1 y) r = 1, for x, y ∈ F\{0}. Since K f = {0} ∪ {z r : z ∈ F\{0}}, there are k = 1 + (p n − 1)/r equivalence classes.
Partition of Unity of Z p l
Let s ∈ N be a divisor of (p − 1) and k = 1 +
, and h(x) = 0, for
. Thus, the set
, a partition of unity of Z p l can be obtained.
Multivariate Polynomials that Evaluate to only Invertible Elements
Let f (z) ∈ F[z] be a polynomial which is not surjective as a mapping from F into F. Then, there exists an element c ∈ F, such that f (z)− c = 0, for every z ∈ F. For a ∈ F\{0} and g(z 1 , . . . , 
Thus, for digital signature hashing keys in section 3.1, the appropriate choices for a nonvanishing function f (z) = 0, z ∈ F, are those similar to the choice of discriminating functions discussed at the end of section 2.1.2.
i , where r ∈ N, l i ∈ N and p i are distinct prime numbers, for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, and f (z) ∈ Z n [z]. From section 1.3, it can be recalled that, f (z) ∈ Z * n , for z ∈ Z n , if and only if for every i, where
Univariate Bijective Mappings without Parameters
Single Variable Permutation Polynomials without Hashing
, also called permutation polynomials, are extensively studied as Dickson polynomials [13] in the literature. A comprehensive survey on Dickson polynomials can be found in [1, 18, 31, 38, 39] . Some recent results are presented in [2, 3, 4] . If f (z) ∈ F[z] is a permutation polynomial, then, for every a ∈ F\{0}, b ∈ F and nonnegative integer i, the polynomial af (z p i )− b is a permutation polynomial. Some easy examples are described in the following. 
, and therefore, the null space of f (z), as a linear operator from F into F with Z p as the field, is {0}. Thus, f (z) is a permutation polynomial. (C) Let r be a positive integer relatively prime to (p n − 1). Then, the polynomial f (z) = z r is a permutation polynomial.
Let l ∈ N and p be a prime number. For any positive integer n, Dickson polynomials that are permutation polynomials, having nonvanishing derivatives over the finite field containing p n elements, are found in [1, 2, 3, 4, 18, 31, 38, 39] . For a small prime number p, two methods for construction of permutation polynomials f (x) ∈ Z p [x], such that f ′ (x) = 0 mod p, are described below. As a set, Z p is taken to be the set of integers i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1. For p = 2, the only permutation polynomials are f (x) = x and f (x) = x − 1, and in both cases, f ′ (x) = 1 mod 2. Now, let p ≥ 3 be a small prime number, such that the computations below are not difficult for implementation.
and j ∈ Z p , and ℓ
, where p ≥ 3. Thus, the parameters c 0 , σ, b j and c j ,
, which implies that every element in the sequence of numbers (f ′ (i) + σ) mod p, for 0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1, is independent of the choice of σ, and the condition that
, the elementary symmetric polynomials s r (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n ), which are homogeneous of degree r in n variables, for the particular instances of parameters n = p and t i = i − 1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ p, as defined in [30] , are all congruent to 0 mod p, for 1 ≤ r ≤ p − 2. Thus,
The coefficients c i , for 0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1, must be so chosen that the additional requirement that f (x)+ σx is a polynomial of degree at most 2p − 2 can also be fulfilled. Now, let λ i ∈ Z p , for 0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1, be chosen, such that the cardinality of the set Λ = {λ i : 0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1} is at most p − 1 and
, for all choices of c 0 . Now, let σ be chosen from Z p \Λ, where the latter set is nonempty, since the cardinality of Λ is at most p − 1, by the choices of λ i , for 0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1. Finally, c 0 is chosen, and b j and c j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ p − 1, are determined by the aforementioned conditions.
For a small prime number p, positive integers l and r, such that l ≥ 2 and 1 ≤ r ≤ l, a bijective mapping
, the following procedure computes x r ∈ Z p r , such that f r (x r ) ≡ y mod p r , assuming
where f r (x) = f (x) mod p r , applying the mod p r operation only to the coefficients. Let 2 ≤ r ≤ l, where l ≥ 2, s ∈ N be such that r 2 ≤ s ≤ r − 1 and y r = y mod p r ∈ Z p r , and
, for some mapping g r, s (x s , y r ), and therefore,
, and the procedure can be stopped; otherwise, the previous steps are repeated, replacing the current value of r by min{2r, l}.
Examples in EX P F ; [z] Let F be a finite field of p n elements, for some prime number p and n ∈ N, such that p n ≥ 3, and let n = p n − 1. Let t ≥ 2 be a positive integer divisor of p n − 1, and let H t = {x t = 1 :
be such that f (x) mod t yields a polynomial mapping from Z t onto itself. It may be recalled that, as a set, Z t is assumed to consist of integers i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ t − 1. Let a be a primitive element in F * . Now, for x ∈ H t , since x t = 1, applying log a operation on both sides, t log a x = 0 mod n, which implies that log a x is an integer multiple of n t = p n −1 t , for every x ∈ H t , and, since the cyclic subgroup generated by a n t is H t , it follows that log a is a bijective mapping of H t onto n t · Z n = {( in t ) mod n : 0 ≤ i ≤ t − 1}. Now, f (log a (x)) mod n, for x ∈ H t , is an injective mapping, when restricted to H t , which can be modified appropriately, by changing its constant term, if necessary, to obtain a polynomial g, which results in a bijective mapping from n t · Z n into itself, with respect to mod n operation.
Then, the mapping η(x) = a g(log a x) , for x ∈ F * , is such that its restriction to H t is a bijective mapping from H t onto itself.
Hybrid Single Variable Permutation Polynomials with Hashing
Method 1
Let σ be a permutation on {1, . . . , k}, such that the set cardinalities of S i and S σ(i) are equal, for
is a surjective (hence bijective) polynomial from F onto F. For inverting χ(x) = y, for fixed y ∈ F, let ξ = η −1 (y). Now, there exists exactly one index i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ k, such that ξ ∈ S σ(i) = g i (S i ), and therefore, the unique element x ∈ S i , such that
The case of bijective mappings in EX P(F ; [x]) can be similarly discussed. In the following examples, the corresponding examples in section 2.1.2 are revisited.
where t is a small positive integer, such as t ∈ {1, 2}, as described in the first example in section 2.1.2 and let V = {x ∈ F :
Thus, in the notation of the above discussion, the permutation polynomial
t , where t is a large positive integer dividing p n − 1, as described in the second example of section 2.1.2. Let a 1 = 0 and a i ∈ F * , for 2 ≤ i ≤ k, where k = 1 + (p n −1) t , be such that {f (a i ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ k} is the codomain of f . Let σ be a permutation on {1, . . . , k}, such that σ(1) = 1, and let H t = {y ∈ F : y t = 1}. Then,
be a bijective mapping discussed in the previous section, for 2 ≤ i ≤ k. Thus, representing elements c i ∈ F * can be found easily, such that the mapping
Method 2 Let G be F * or F. Let f and h be mappings from G into itself, such that f is bijective and h(f (x)) = h(x), for x ∈ G. For instance, if (A) f is such that the cyclic group generated by it, as a subgroup of bijective mappings from G into G, with composition as the group operation, is of small order ρ ≥ 2, (B) g : G ρ → F is a symmetric function, which can be an expression in EX P(F ; [z 1 , . . . , z ρ ]), symmetric in all the ρ variables,
, for x ∈ G. Let x, y ∈ G be such that ζ(x) = ζ(y), and let i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} be such that ℓ i (h(x)) = 1 and
Multivariate Injective Mappings without Parameters
In this subsection, an iterative algorithm to construct a multivariate bijective mapping from G m into E m , for m ∈ N, is described. The algorithm utilizes parametric univariate bijective mappings discussed in the previous sections. In later subsections, some variations involving hashing are described.
1. Let f i : G → G and g i : E → E, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, be bijective mappings. h i (z 1 , . . . , z m−1 ; x) be parametric injective mappings from G into E, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, x ∈ G and z 1 , . . . , z m−1 ∈ E being parameters, constructed, for example, as described in section 2.1.1.
Let
For finding x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ G m , such that η(x) = y, for any fixed y = (y 1 , . . . , y m ) ∈ E m , let
respectively, from F * into F * , then the above procedure can be applied to obtain multivariate bijective mappings from G m into G m . These mappings are required in appealing for a security that is immune to threats resulting from Gröbner basis analysis. It can be observed that one level of exponentiation suffices for the purpose.
Hybrid Multivariate Injective Mappings with Hashing
For Method 1 of the previous subsection, in the first example, in place of T (x), x ∈ F, T (α(x)), x ∈ F m , and in the second example, in place of (log a x) , . . . , a φ m (log a x) ), where log a x = (log a x 1 , . . . , log a x m ) and Φ(y) = (φ 1 (y) , . . . , φ m (y)) is a bijective mapping from Z m n into itself, such that the cyclic subgroup generated by Φ, with respect to function composition operation, has a group order ρ, while g can be chosen to be an expression from EX P(F ; [z 1, 1 , . . . , z m, 1 , . . . , z 1, ρ , . . . , z m, ρ ]), which is symmetric in the ρ vectors (z 1, i , . . . , z m, i ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ. If g = π t , for a symmetric mapping π obtained by taking product of terms as appropriate and a large positive integer divisor t of n, then since tΦ(y) is a bijective mapping from tZ m n into itself, the order of the cyclic subgroup generated by tΦ(y), as a subgroup of the group of bijective mappings from tZ m n into itself, can be ensured to be only a small divisor of ρ, resulting in a more efficient method of hashing, even for a very large and perhaps unknown ρ. It can be observed that g can be chosen to depend only on a few scalar components from each vector, while maintaining symmetry in all its vector parameters, with each vector consisting of m scalars components, and that the main objective in Method 2 hashing is to produce a hashing function h that evaluates to the same same value, even if f is applied on its arguments.
Public Key Cryptography and Digital Signature
Let the number of elements in the plain message (or plain signature message) be µ, and the number of elements in the encrypted message (or encrypted signature message) be ν, where µ, ν ∈ N and µ ≤ ν. Let E be F or Z n , and G ⊆ E be the set from which plain message elements are sampled. If the number of plain and encrypted (or plain and signed) messages are the same, then a multivariate bijective mapping P : G µ → G µ is chosen and advertised in the public key lookup table T, while P −1 is saved in the back substitution table B. Let (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ µ ) ∈ G µ be plain message. For public key cryptography, the encrypted message is (ǫ 1 , . . . , ǫ µ ) = P (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ µ ), and the decryption is P −1 (ǫ 1 , . . . , ǫ µ ). For digital signature, the signed message is (ǫ 1 , . . . , ǫ µ ) = P −1 (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ µ ), and recovered message is P (ǫ 1 , . . . , ǫ µ ). In the remaining part of the section, it is assumed that 1 ≤ µ ≤ ν−1. Let ν = µ + λ, for some positive integer λ. Let κ be the number of padding message elements in the hashing keys. Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x µ ) ∈ G µ be the plain message, y = (y 1 , . . . , y ν ) ∈ E ν be the encrypted or signed message, and ω = (ω 1 , . . . , ω κ ) ∈ G κ be a padding message. The multivariate mappings in the rest of this section are expressions from either E[t 1 , . . . , t m , σ 1 , . . . , σ n ] or EX P (E ; [t 1 , . . . , t m , σ 1 , . . . , σ n ] ), for some appropriate variable names t and σ, and subscript numbers m and n, depending on the context of occurrence and arity of the mappings.
Hashing Keys
The following subroutine generates the hashing keys required by the algorithms of sections 3.2 and 3.3.
Subroutine for Generation of Hashing Keys
The table generated is the private key hash table H, containing the hashing keys.
1. The following inputs to the subroutine are taken: positive integers µ, κ, L, λ, and a binary flag SIGN, where L is the number of hashing keys, L ≤ λ, and SIGN is set to the binary value true, if this subroutine is called for digital signature, and set to false for public key cryptography.
2. The private key hash table H is initialized to empty set. The input parameters are saved in the private key hash table H. Let ν = µ + λ. 
4. Now, a parametric multivariate injective mapping η(y 1 , . . . , y λ−L ; z), z = (z 1 , . . . , z L ), is selected such that η −1 (y 1 , . . . , y λ−L ; z) can be computed easily (discussed in section 2.1). The multivariate mappings required to compute both η(y 1 , . . . , y λ−L ; z) and η −1 (y 1 , . . . , y λ−L ; z) are saved in the private key hash table H. If SIGN is set to true, then this procedure is called for generating digital signature hashing keys, and hence, let g l (y 1 , . . . , y λ ) = η −1 l (y 1 , . . . , y λ−L ; (y λ−L+1 , . . . , y λ )), 1 ≤ l ≤ L, which are also saved in the private key hash table H.
Let
which are saved in the private key hash table H. Thus, for ( ω) ) . The parametric multivariate injective mapping η(y 1 , . . . , y λ−L ; z) are required to be so chosen that (i) it is easily expressible as a multivariate mapping, for public key cryptography, and (ii) η −1 (y 1 , . . . , y λ−L ; z) and g l (y 1 , . . . , y λ ), 1 ≤ l ≤ L, are easily expressible as multivariate mappings, for digital signature, and for signature authentication, the multivariate mappings Q i (x, ω), 1 ≤ i ≤ λ, must occur as public key mappings, which need to be easily expressible, as well.
Public Key Cryptography (PKC)
The input is the private key hash table H, containing the hashing keys.
Public Key Cryptography Key Generation Algorithm
The tables generated are as follows: (1) the private key back substitution table B, containing information for decryption of public key encrypted message, and (2) the public key lookup table T, containing the multivariate mappings for encrypting plain message.
1. The subroutine for generation of hashing keys (described in section 3.1) is called, which takes input parameters, viz., positive integers µ, κ, L, λ, and a binary flag SIGN, which is set to false by the calling function, generates the multivariate mappings f l (x, ω), 1 ≤ l ≤ L, and Q i (x, ω), 1 ≤ i ≤ λ, sets ν = µ + λ, and saves them in the private key hash 
3. An invertible affine linear transformation T : E ν → E ν is selected, and its inverse transformation T −1 is saved in the back substitution table B.
4. Let P 1 (x, ω), . . . , P ν (x, ω) = T Q 1 (x, ω), . . . , Q ν (x, ω) be the encryption multivariate mappings, which are advertised in the public key lookup table T, along with µ, ν, κ, E and G.
Encryption Let (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ µ ) be the plain message. The encryptor chooses padding message ω 1 , . . . , ω κ ∈ F, computes ǫ i = P i (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ µ , ω 1 , . . . , ω κ ), 1 ≤ i ≤ ν, and transmits (ǫ 1 , . . . , ǫ ν ) to the receiver.
Decryption The input items required for decryption are read from the private key hash table H and the private key back substitution table B. The decryption algorithm is as follows:
1. Let ǫ 1 , . . . , ǫ ν ∈ E ν be the received encrypted message. where (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ µ ) is the plain message (to be decrypted in the subsequent steps), and (ω 1 , . . . , ω κ ) is the padding message, which will not be decrypted. Let
4. The plain message is (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ µ ) = ζ −1 z 1 , . . . , z L ; (v λ+1 , . . . , v ν ) .
Digital Signature (DS)
Digital Signature Key Generation Algorithm The tables generated are as follows: (1) the private key digital signature table S, containing information for signing the plain message, (2) the public key signature verification table V, containing the multivariate mappings for recovery of plain message, and (3) the public key signature authentication table A, containing the multivariate mappings for verifying the authentication of the plain message.
1. The subroutine for generation of hashing keys (described in section 3.1) is called, which takes input parameters, viz., positive integers µ, κ, L, λ, and a binary flag SIGN, which is set to true by the calling function now, generates the multivariate mappings f l (x, ω), g l z 1 , . . . , z λ , 1 ≤ l ≤ L, and Q i (x, ω), 
A parametric multivariate bijective mapping
µ is selected such that the parametric inverse ζ −1 (z 1 , . . . , z L ; x) can be computed easily (discussed in section 2.1). The information required to compute ζ(z 1 , . . . , z L ; x) and ζ −1 (z 1 , . . . , z L ; x) is saved in the private key signature table S.
Let
1 ≤ i ≤ µ, be the signature verification multivariate mappings which are advertised in the public key signature verification table V, along with µ, ν, κ, E and G, and let the plain message authentication multivariate mappings be S i (x, ω) = Q i (x, ω), 1 ≤ i ≤ λ, which are advertised in the public key signature authentication table A, along with µ, ν, κ, E and G. The signature verification table V is advertised as a public key, with read permissions for the intended receiver to access. There are two possibilities for signature authentication verification: (i) a public authority, that is responsible for providing signature authentication ascertainment and for possible issuance of a certification to that effect, is identified, which is referred to herein as a trusted authentication verifier (TAV), in which case, the padding message is transmitted to the intended receiver, possibly encrypting it by a public or shared key encryption algorithm, whereas the decryption key for the padding message and the signature authentication 1. The signer chooses padding message (ω 1 , . . . , ω κ ) ∈ G κ , either generating them randomly, or based on previous correspondences.
The signer computes the hash values
L, the authentication header entries ǫ i = Q i (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ µ , ω 1 , . . . , ω κ ), 1 ≤ i ≤ λ, and the signed message entries (ǫ λ+1 , . . . , ǫ ν ) = ζ −1 (z 1 , . . . , z L ; (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ µ )).
3. The signature message is ǫ 1 , . . . , ǫ ν , which is transmitted to the intended receiver, while the padding message ω 1 , . . . , ω κ is either transmitted to the intended receiver together with the signature, either on demand or for free, or communicated to a trusted authentication verifier (TAV), with which the signer registers the signature authentication table A.
Digital Signature Verification Algorithm The input items required for signature verification are public key signature verification table V, and the signature authentication table A or a method for ascertaining by a trusted authentication verifier (TAV). The signature verification algorithm is as follows:
1. Let ǫ 1 , . . . , ǫ ν be the received signature message. The padding ω 1 , . . . , ω κ may have also been optionally received.
Let
The plain signature message is (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ µ ). The public key signature verification table V contains the information required in this step.
3. If the signature authentication table A is available, then the authentication of the plain message can be verified by testing whether
otherwise, a public authority TAV, that is responsible for signature authentication ascertainment, may be approached.
Complexity Analysis of Computing Nonparametric Inverses of Parametric Multivariate Polynomial Mappings
Model theory of fields and polynomial algebras is extensively studied in mathematical logic [12, 14, 20, 35, 36] . Let F be a field, and let ARIT H-EXP (F) be the set of arithmetic expressions without quantifiers, obtained by collecting the expressions involving any number of finitely many variables, constructed using parentheses and the binary or unary arithmetic operators of addition +, subtraction −, multiplication ·, possibly division /, exponentiation k , where k is a positive integer, and binary valued relational operator = (and possibly other relational operators such as <, >, ≤ and ≥). The relational operators allow construction of assertions that evaluate to anyone of the special symbolic constants false and true, represented by 0 and 1, respectively. In the sequel, the variables assume values from F, the arithmetic expressions evaluate to values in F, as defined by the arithmetic operations in F, and the assertions evaluate to values in {0, 1}. A variable taking values in {0, 1} is a boolean variable. The arithmetic expressions in ARIT H-EXP (Z 2 ) are boolean expressions. For any field F, a boolean variable x can be obtained from the equation x 2 − x = 0. For boolean variables x and y, ¬x can be represented by 1 − x, x ∧ y by x · y, x ∨ y by 1
, and x ↔ y by 1 − (x − y) 2 , where ¬ denotes the logical "negation", ∧ the logical "and", ∨ the logical "or", ⊕ the logical "exclusive or", → the logical "implies", and ↔ the logical "implies and is implied by". Let ARIT H-EXP Q (F) be the set of arithmetic expressions in which some (none, some or all) variables are constrained by "existential" ∃ or "universal" ∀ quantifiers. f (x 1 , . . . , x m , y 1 , . . . , y n ), where m and n are positive integers, and k i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, are nonnegative integers such that k i ≤ k i+1 , for 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, and k m ≤ n. The variables y j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, are independent variables, as they are bound to universal quantifiers. The variable x i depends on the variables y j , 1 ≤ j ≤ k i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and is a dependent bound variable. A tuple (a 1 , . . . , for y k i +1 , . . . , y k i+1 ∈ F, and for some x i+1 ∈ F, depending on y k i +1 , . . . , y k i+1 , is feasible. If for every b 1 , . . . , b k 1 ∈ F, there exists a 1 ∈ F, such that the tuple (a 1 , b 1 , . . . , b k 1 ) is feasible, then the given instance of binary valued quantified arithmetic expression is satisfiable. The evaluation problem for quantified boolean expressions in prenex normal form with no free variables in ARIT H-EXP Q (F) is to find whether the given input instance is satisfiable. Let ARIT H-EXP Q−SAT (F) ⊆ ARIT H-EXP Q (F) be the set of satisfiable binary valued quantified arithmetic expressions (i.e., quantified arithmetic assertions) in prenex normal form with no free variables that evaluate to true. Let B Q and B Q−SAT be ARIT H-EXP Q (Z 2 ) and ARIT H-EXP Q−SAT (Z 2 ), respectively. By the previous discussion, every boolean expression in B Q , analogously in B Q−SAT , can be represented by some arithmetic expression in ARIT H-EXP Q (F), analogously in ARIT H-EXP Q−SAT (F), with equality binary relation, for any field F. The evaluation problem for quantified boolean expressions in prenex normal form with no free variables in B Q is PSPACEcomplete, where PSPACE is the set of formal languages acceptable in polynomial space [25] . (a 1 , . . . , a r , b 1 , . . . , b k r ) ∈ F r+k r , 1 ≤ r ≤ m, is functionally feasible by quantifier free arithmetic expressions to the given constraint satisfaction problem, if there exist quantifier free arithmetic expressions g 1 (y 1 , . . . , y k 1 ) and g i (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , y 1 , . . . , y k i ), 2 ≤ i ≤ m, in ARIT H-EXP (F), such that the following holds: ∀y 1 . . . ∀y n f (x 1 , . . . , x m , y 1 , . . . , y n ) = true, where 1 and g i (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , b 1 
Constraint Satisfaction Problem
It can be observed that for a finite field F, a feasible tuple is also functionally feasible by quantifier free arithmetic expressions. A solution to the constraint satisfaction problem is to find quantifier free arithmetic expressions, if and when they exist, g 1 (y 1 , . . . , y k 1
) for x 1 and g i (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , y 1 , . . . , y k i ) for x i , 2 ≤ i ≤ m, such that for all y 1 . . . y n ∈ F, f (x 1 , . . . , x m , y 1 , . . . , y n ) = 1, where
) and
The constraint satisfaction problem is feasible, if it has a solution in quantifier free arithmetic expressions. where m and n are positive integers and
, be a given instance of binary valued quantified boolean expression with no free variables in B Q for the evaluation problem. Let
be an instance to the constraint satisfaction problem with no free variables, which can be easily shown to be in B Q−SAT , since feasibility coincides with functional feasibility by arithmetic expressions for Z 2 . The input binary valued quantified boolean expression evaluates to 1 if and only if w 1 is 1 in any solution to the constructed instance of the constraint satisfaction problem. Now, as discussed at the beginning of the section, the field Z 2 , together with all its arithmetic and logical operations, can be emulated by the arithmetic operations and equality operator with any field F. Thus, the constraint satisfaction problem for ARIT H-EXP Q−SAT (F), which includes equivalent binary valued quantified arithmetic expressions for those in B Q−SAT , is PSPACEhard.
Quantifier Elimination Problem
Let P(F) be a set of parametric subsets of F, parametrized by variables assuming values in F, such that the binary valued characteristic functions of the sets are assertions in ARIT H-EXP (F). Now, for an instance in ARIT H-EXP Q (F), the quantifier elimination problem is to compute parametric sets G 1 (y 1 , . . . , y k 1 ) in P(F), for y 1 , . . . , y k 1 ∈ F, and G i (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , y 1 , . . . , y k i ) in P(F), for (x 1 , . . . , x i , y 1 , . . . , y k i ) is feasible to the given instance}, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. If F is the field of rational numbers, with the set of binary relations {=, <, ≤, >, ≥} and the set of constants {0, 1}, then the emptiness testing of parametric subsets of F n , for an arbitrary positive integer n, where the characteristic functions of the parametric subsets are binary valued quantified arithmetic expressions, is decidable (or computable), and quantifier elimination is possible, i.e., equivalent quantifier free arithmetic assertions can be computed for the quantified arithmetic assertions as characteristic functions for the parametric subsets of F n [12, 14, 35, 47] . Thus, ARIT H-EXP Q (F) admits quantifier elimination, and the sets of feasibility tuples for instances in ARIT H-EXP Q (F) have characteristic functions in ARIT H-EXP (F), that can be computed by an algorithm. Set solutions can be enumerated by backtracking method [26] . By the same proof of Theorem 1, the quantifier elimination problem can be shown to be PSPACE-hard. be an instance in B Q for the quantifier elimination problem in prenex normal form with no free variables. Let X i (x 1 , . . . , x i , y 1 , . . . , y k i ) be the characteristic function of the set
In the remaining part of the proof, the sets G i (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , y 1 , . . . , y k i ) are represented by the pair of boolean functions 
After obtaining the boolean functions X i+1, b (x 1 , . . . , x i , y 1 , . . . , y k i+1
. , x i−1 , y 1 , . . . , y k i ), for x 1 , . . . , x i , y 1 , . . . , y k i+1 ∈ F, are the solutions to the boolean variables v i, b , 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, b ∈ Z 2 , respectively, for the following instance of constraint satisfaction problem:
Now, for avoiding the possibility of dependence of a solution for v i, 1 on v i, 0 , the formulas in the above are encoded treating the variables in pairs, , and discarding the other subexpression containing the variable v i, b⊕1 and the quantifiers constraining the variables x i and v i, b⊕1 , for b ∈ Z 2 , 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Now, as discussed in the beginning of the section, the field Z 2 , together with all its arithmetic and logical operations, can be emulated by the arithmetic operations and equality operator with any field F. The characteristic functions of set solutions to the quantifier elimination problem for binary valued instances in prenex normal form with no free variables in ARIT H-EXP Q (F), which includes B Q , are unique. Thus, the constraint satisfaction problem for instances in ARIT H-EXP Q−SAT (F), that have unique solutions, is PSPACE-hard, since the stated set of instances also contains those instances encoding the characteristic functions for quantifier elimination problem for instances in B Q .
Parametric Multivariate Polynomial Mappings
In this subsection, let F be a finite field. For integers l ≥ 0, m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 1, a parametric multivariate polynomial mapping, with z 1 , . . . , z l as parameters, is η(z; x) = (η 1 (z; x) , . . . , η n (z; x)), where z = (z 1 , . . . , z l ), x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ), and η i (z; x) ∈ F[z 1 , . . . , z l , x 1 , . . . , x m ], for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A parametric left inverse η ♯ (z; y), y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ), of a parametric multivariate polynomial mapping η(z; x) on X ⊆ F l × F m is as follows: for every z ∈ F l , x ∈ F m and y ∈ F n , such that (z 1 , . . . , z l , x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ X, if η(z; x) = y, then η ♯ (z; y) = x. A parametric right inverse η ♮ (z; y) on Y ⊆ F l ×F n of a parametric multivariate polynomial mapping η(z; x) is as follows: for every z ∈ F l , x ∈ F m and y ∈ F n , such that (z 1 , . . . , z l , y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ Y , if η ♮ (z; y) = x, then η(z; x) = y. For z ∈ F l , let S ♯ η (z; x), x ∈ F m , and S ♮ η (z; y), y ∈ F n , be as follows: S ♯ η (z; x) = {(z 1 , . . . , z l , y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ F l ×F n : η(z; x) = y}, and S ♮ η (z; y) = {(z 1 , . . . , z l , x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ F l ×F m : η(z; x) = y}. Now, the following statements hold: (1) for z ∈ F l and x ∈ F m , the set S ♯ η (z; x) contains exactly one element; (2) for z ∈ F l and y ∈ F n , the set S ♮ η (z; y) may be empty or nonempty; (3) a parametric left inverse η ♯ (z; y) can be defined on the set (z 1 , ..., z l , x 1 , ..., x m )∈X S ♯ η (z; x) if and only if
∈ X, x = x ′ ; and (4) a parametric right inverse η ♮ (z; y) can be defined on the set Y if and only if S ♮ η (z; y) = ∅, for every (z 1 , . . . , z l , y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ Y . If a parametric left inverse (similarly, a parametric right inverse) of a parametric multivariate polynomial mapping does not depend on the parameters, then it is nonparametric. Let with l parameters, for arbitrary nonnegative integer l and positive integers m and n, for the instances for which the stated inverses exist, are both PSPACE-hard.
Proof. Let ∀y 1 , . . . , ∀y k ∃w 0 ∃w 1 ∀y k+1 , . . . , ∀y n f (w 0 , w 1 , y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ B Q−SAT , for some positive integer n and nonnegative integer k ≤ n, be an instance for the constraint satisfaction problem, having unique solutions for each of the dependent variables w b separately as quantifier free boolean expressions g b (y 1 , . . . , y k ) ∈ ARIT H-EXP (Z 2 ), for b ∈ Z 2 . For w 0 , w 1 , y 1 , . . . , y n ∈ Z 2 , let h 0 (w 1 , y 1 , . . . , y n ) = f (0, w 1 , y 1 , . . . , y n ) ⊕ f (1, w 1 , y 1 , . . . , y n ), and let h 1 (w 0 , y 1 , . . . , y n ) = f (w 0 , 0, y 1 , . . . , y n ) ⊕ f (w 0 , 1, y 1 , . . . , y n ). Let ζ(z; x), z = (z 1 , . . . , z n−k ) and x = (x 1 , . . . , x k+2 ), be a parametric multivariate polynomial mapping from Z k+2 2 into Z k+5 2 , with parameters z 1 , . . . , z n−k as follows:
and ζ k+5 (z; x) = [¬ζ k+4 (z; x)]∧x k+2 , Now, if ζ(z; x) = y, where y = (y 1 , . . . , y k+5 ), then x i = y i , for 1 (y 1 , . . . , y k )) ∨ y k+1 ∧ g 0 (y 1 , . . . , y k ) , and x k+2 = [(¬y k+4 ) ∧ y k+5 ] ∨ y k+4 ∧ (¬y k+1 )∧ (¬g 1 (y 1 , . . . , y k )) ∨ y k+1 ∧g 1 (y 1 , . . . , y k ) . Thus, a nonparametric left inverse ζ ♯ (y), y = (y 1 , . . . , y k+5 ), of ζ(z; x) can be defined for (z 1 , . . . , z n−k , x 1 , . . . ,
, and computing nonparametric left inverses of parametric multivariate polynomial mappings is PSPACE-hard. Let η(z; x), z = (z 1 , . . . , z n−k ) and x = (x 1 , . . . , x k+2 ), be a parametric multivariate polynomial mapping from Z , with parameters z 1 , . . . , z n−k as follows: η i (z; x) = x i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and η k+1 (z; x) = f (x k+1 , x k+2 , x 1 , . . . , x k , z 1 , . . . , z n−k ). Now, if η(z; x) = y, where y = (y 1 , . . . , y k+1 ), then x i = y i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, x k+1 = g 0 (y 1 , . . . , y k ), and x k+2 = g 1 (y 1 , . . . , y k ). Thus, a nonparametric right inverse η
, with y k+1 = 1 in y = (y 1 , . . . , y k , y k+1 ), and computing nonparametric right inverses of parametric multivariate polynomial mappings is PSPACEhard.
Simultaneous Multivariate Polynomial Equations over F
Let l, m, m ∈ N andf i x 1 , . . . , x m , y 1 , . . . , y n ∈ ARIT H-EXP (F), for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, be binary valued arithmetic expressions. A system of polynomial equations is the following:
where y j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, are independent variables and x i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, are dependent variables, assuming values from F, both specified as part of an instance. The problem of solving a system of polynomial equations is to compute the solution as a maximal set G 1 y 1 , . . . , y n ⊆ F, for x 1 , and, for each a 1 ∈ G 1 y 1 , . . . , y n , . . . , and a i−1 ∈ G i−1 a 1 , . . . , a i−2 , y 1 , . . . , y n , a maximal set G i a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , y 1 , . . . , y n ⊆ F, for x i and 2 ≤ i ≤ m, such that for each tuple b 1 , . . . , b n ∈ F n ,
In the above system, the ordering of the variables x 1 , . . . , x m appears specified. However, this ordering can be made innocuous by additional constraints as follows:
w i, j = 1 and
where y j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, are independent variables, and all the remaining variables are dependent variables. The ordering is concealed by allowing the system to choose an appropriate ordering of the variables x m+1 , . . . , x 2m , while allowing x 1 , . . . , x m to appear in the specified order. In the above set of constraints, for each row of the matrix w i, j 1≤i, j≤m , for the constraints on i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and for each column of the matrix w i, j 1≤i, j≤m , for the constraints on j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, the first constraint requires at least one entry of 1, and the second constraint requires (m− 1) entries of 0, in the respective row or column, and the matrix w i, j 1≤i, j≤m is a permutation matrix.
Theorem 4
The constraint satisfaction problem for instances in B Q−SAT is polynomial time reducible to the problem of solving systems of polynomial equations. Then, the complete solution for x r , 1 ≤ r ≤ m, must agree with w i r , l, 0 as well as with w i r , l, 1 , k r + 1 ≤ l ≤ n, which admit a complete solution that is independent of y l , whenever k r < n. Thus the complete solution of the above system of equations yields a complete solution for the instance Q 1 v 1 . . . ∀y n f (x 1 , . . . , x m , y 1 , . . . , y n ) be an instance in ARIT H-EXP Q−SAT (F), let v i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m and t j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, be new variables, and let f (x 1 , . . . , x m , y 1 , . . . , y n ) = 1 f (v 1 , . . . , v m , t 1 , . . . , t n ) = 1 and (
be an instance of system of simultaneous polynomial equations, which is referred to in this proof as the combined system of polynomial equations. It can be easily seen that the solution to the quantifier elimination problem is also a solution for the system of simultaneous polynomial equations, and therefore, it remains to be shown that a solution for the quantifier elimination problem is maximal for the corresponding instance of combined system of simultaneous polynomial equations. To this end, it can be observed that for any maximal set solution G ′ 1 (y 1 , . . . , y n ), for x 1 , such that f (x 1 , . . . , x m , y 1 , . . . , y n ) = 1, for some x 2 , . . . , x m ∈ F, and any maximal set solution H which is included in a maximal set solution for x 1 , such that the following holds: ∀t k 1 +1 . . . ∀t n f (x 1 , . . . , x m , y 1 , . . . , y k 1 , t k 1 +1 , . . . , t n ) = 1, for some x i ∈ F, 2 ≤ i ≤ m. Thus, a maximal set solution for x 1 of the combined system of polynomial equations is included in that for the quantifier elimination problem, and analogously, for x i , as can be shown by induction on i, for 2 ≤ i ≤ m.
It can be observed that the reduction proposed in the proof of Theorem 5 simplifies the result presented in [47] . For an ordered field F with Archimedean property, such that −1 < 0 and (−1) 2 = 1 > 0, the constraints (i) x > 0 and (ii) x ≥ 0 can be implemented by two equation constraints in three independent variables as follows: (i ′ ) x−y 2 = 0 and yz −1 = 0, and (ii ′ ) x−y 2 = 0, respectively. Then, a system of polynomial equations over any field can be solved by classical methods of [12, 14] , and the Gröbner basis methods can be applied to the resulting system of simultaneous multivariate polynomial equations.
Conclusions
Security Analysis
The classical analysis of multivariate simultaneous equations can be applied only to polynomial equations [12, 14, 34, 35, 36, 47] , and the Gröbner basis analysis [8, 16, 17] cannot be extended to mappings involving functions as exponents. For a security that is immune to threats from Gröbner basis analysis, parametric injective mappings from G µ into E ν , with κ parameters, for G = F * , E = F and µ, ν, κ ∈ N, where 1 ≤ µ ≤ ν and F is a finite field, with component mappings taken as expressions from EX P F ; [x 1 , . . . , x µ , ω 1 , . . . , ω κ ] , restricting values of x i and ω j to F * , for 1 ≤ i ≤ µ and 1 ≤ j ≤ κ, with one level of exponentiation as described in section 1.5, are adequate.
The relevance of the complexity analysis described in section 4.3 is as follows: let x = (x 1 , . . . , x µ ), ω = (ω 1 , . . . , ω κ ) and y = (y 1 , . . . , y ν ). For public key cryptography, the problem of computing x from the equations P i (x, ω) = y i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ν, with parameters ω 1 , . . . , ω κ , requires computation of nonparametric left inverse for (x 1 , . . . , x µ , ω 1 , . . . , ω κ ) ∈ F µ+κ . For digital signature, the problem of computing y from the equations P i (y) = x i , 1 ≤ i ≤ µ, y i = x µ+i , where S i (x, ω) = x µ+i , 1 ≤ i ≤ λ, with parameters ω 1 , . . . , ω κ , requires computation of nonparametric right inverse for (x 1 , . . . , x µ , x µ+1 , . . . , x ν , ω 1 , . . . , ω κ ) ∈ F ν+κ , constrained by S i (x, ω) = x µ+i , 1 ≤ i ≤ λ. It can be observed that, for digital signature, ω could be under control of a trusted authentication verifier (TAV), which ensures existential unforgeability.
Summary
In this paper, a new public key data encryption method is proposed, where the plain and encrypted messages are arrays. The method can also be used for digital certificate or digital signature applications. The key generation algorithm is particularly simple, easy and fast, facilitating changes of keys as frequently as required, and fast algorithms for polynomial multiplication and modular arithmetic [7, 40] , whenever appropriate, can be adapted in the encryption and decryption algorithms.
